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 This thesis examines Haiti’s role in international drug trafficking, how it impacts 
Haiti’s political and economic development, and how Haiti and the United States are 
combating the drug trade.  The thesis argues that Haiti’s geographic location, political 
culture, illegal immigrants, entrepreneurial class and weak institutions have made it a 
major transshipment point for drugs to the United States from South America.  Haiti’s 
weak democratic institutions, dysfunctional judicial system and fledgling police force 
present South American drug traffickers with a path of little resistance.   
 Drug trafficking has contributed to violence, corruption, political instability, poor 
economic development and lack of democratic consolidation in Haiti today.  Finally, the 
thesis examines Haiti and the United States’ efforts to combat drug trafficking in Haiti.  
Although Haiti has made steps to adhere to the measures the UN drug convention set 
forth, Haiti’s counternarcotics initiatives have suffered due to a long political crisis 
between the executive and legislative and economic instability.  Despite the lack of a 
bilateral counternarcotics agreement between the U. S. and Haiti, the two countries 
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Illegal immigration, drug trafficking and money laundering threaten the United 
States’ domestic politics and strain its relations with Haiti.  Since the early 1990s, the 
United States has focused much attention on Haiti, a nation which has greatly influenced 
U.S. hemispheric policy.  The U.S. objectives have been to help Haiti strengthen its 
democratic institutions, restore its political stability, promote an open economy and deter 
drug trafficking.  Pursing these objectives has been a monumental challenge, for Haiti is 
struggling to overcome political, economic and social legacies of two centuries of 
authoritarian regimes.     
 This thesis examines Haiti’s role in international drug trafficking, how it has 
disrupted Haiti’s political and economic development, and how Haiti and the U.S. are 
confronting the drug trade.  The thesis argues that Haiti’s geographic location, political 
culture, illegal immigrants, entrepreneurial class and weak institutions have allowed Haiti 
to become a transit point for drugs to the United States from South America.  Owing to 
Haiti’s weak democratic institutions, dysfunctional judicial system and fledgling police 
force, South American drug traffickers see Haiti as a path of little resistance.  The 
problem is so severe and widespread that many experts suspect that many high-ranking 
officials in the government, judiciary and police force are tolerating or are even directly 
involved in the drug trafficking.  Clearly, drug trafficking in Haiti has contributed to 
violence, corruption, political instability, poor economic development and has 
undermined democratic consolidation. 
 Finally, the thesis examines Haiti and the United States’ efforts to combat drug 
trafficking in Haiti.  Although Haiti has made steps to adhere to the measures the UN drug 
convention set forth, Haiti’s counternarcotics initiatives have suffered due to a long 
political crisis between the executive and legislative and economic instability.  Despite 
the lack of a bilateral counternarcotics agreement between the U. S. and Haiti, the two 
countries cooperate and the DEA maintain a permanent staff of seven agents in Port-au-
Prince.   
 xiv 
 Although the government of Haiti is aware of the nation’s status as a principal 
transit zone from the South to North America for drug trafficking, the government views 
counternarcotics efforts as secondary to matters of political stability, public order, and 
economic development.  This thesis shows how the government of Haiti failed to make a 
connection between drug trafficking and the above problems and how it is preventing 
them from adequately addressing the root causes of social instability.  Likewise, U.S. 
policy must appreciate the constraints under which Haitian leaders operate. 
Chapter II discusses Haiti’s role in international drug trafficking since it s 
attempted transition to democracy began in 1994.  First, it reviews the mode and 
evolution of drug trafficking in Haiti.  Then it explains why Haiti has became a major 
transit point for illicit drugs.  The dysfunctional judicial system and the limited 
capabilities of the Haitian National Police (HNP) are the main focus of attention.   
Chapter III evaluates the impact of drug trafficking on Haiti’s political and 
economic development.  As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is 
extremely vulnerable to official corruption and remains strangled by numerous problems, 
despite efforts to revive its weak economy and to stabilize its volatile politics.  The 
prospects for political stability are slim given the compounding problems of drug 
trafficking, crime, widespread violence, political apathy, and economic depression.  
Widespread corruption linked to drug trafficking severely undermines democratic 
institutions in Haiti, as well as many other nations in the region.  Mounting street crimes 
and violence fueled by economic distress and drug trafficking leaves many Haitians 
insecure and vulnerable.  Drug trafficking threatens to corrupt the basic institutions of 
Haiti, including the police, judiciary and government.  This contributes to an environment 
that is unfavorable to economic development.  In addition, sustained international 
political commitment to nurture democracy in Haiti has been elusive.   
Chapter IV analyzes the bilateral efforts of the governments of Haiti and the 
United States to combat drug trafficking.  The U.S. portion of this effort is needed 
because Haiti has few resources.  Even though the government of Haiti cooperates with 
U.S. officials, including firing tainted police officers, it lacks the resources and the 
 xv 
necessary intelligence information to combat drugs trafficking adequately.  Presently, the 
HNP also lacks logistical support and training, and command and control capabilities.    
Chapter V examines American assistance in Haiti since the restoration of 
democracy in 1994, which has focused on improving of public security, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights.  The U.S. has also focused on bolstering the capacities of the 
Haitian judiciary and newly created Haitian National Police (HNP) to address Haiti’s 
problems.  However, Haiti has far to go before it can take significant, independent action 
in counternarcotics.  Finally, Chapter V provides a conclusion and recommendations for 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The issues of Haitian immigration, drug trafficking and money laundering are 
important issues in the United States’ domestic and foreign politics.1  Since the early 
1990s, Haiti has been a focal point of the United States’ efforts in the hemisphere, greatly 
impacting the U.S. hemispheric policy.  The U.S. objectives have been to help Haiti 
strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights; to restore political 
stability; to promote of an open economy and to develop strategy; to stem illegal 
migration; to deter drug trafficking; and to stabilize the Caribbean region. 2  These 
objectives have been difficult to achieve, given that Haiti is struggling to overcome 
political, economic and social legacies of two centuries of authoritarian regimes.     
During the 21st century, the United States has intervened militarily several times 
in Haiti.3  United States intervention in 1994 sought to restore Haiti’s democracy by 
removing the government from the hands of a corrupt military dictatorship.4  For over 
three years, the military regime in Haiti had been able to preserve its power “through 
repression, manipulation of elections, and general corruption including heavy 
involvement in drug trafficking and other illicit enterprises.”5  Since the 1994 restoration 
of the legitimate government, many believe Haiti is worse off now than before the United 
States intervened.  Six years after the 1994 invasion, drug shipments through Haiti soared 
to unprecedented levels.6  
                                                 
1 Orlando J. Perez, “Drugs and Post-Intervention Political Economy in Haiti and Panama.” p. 138 IN 
Griffith, Ivelaw L. (ed.) The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean .  New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 2000. 
2 Peter F. Romero.  “Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary Peter F. Romero on U.S. Policy Toward 
Haiti,” House International Relations Committee, April 5, 2000.  http://www.us.net/cip/romero2.htm 
[retrieved from the World Wide Web on 04/11/2002] 
3 The United States intervened in Haiti in 1915-34 and again in 1994. 
4 Griffith, p. 138.   
5 Ibid. 
6 Tom Carter, “Cocaine Furthers Setbacks in Haiti Drug Shipments Soar: Votes Tainted,” The 
Washington Times, August 6, 2000. Special Report, page C1. Available on-line.  http://www.haiti-
info.com/Htlm/news08/wastimes.htm [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 02/24/2002] 
2 
This thesis suggests that Haitian drug trafficking has contributed to the violence, 
corruption, political instability, poor economic development and lack of democratic 
consolidation.  Drug trade will hinder Haiti’s hope for democracy.  At present, the 
democratic institutions in Haiti are fragile at best with unemployment, crime, corruption, 
and drug trafficking constantly threatening its stability.  The economy appears to have 
little chance of recovery, for much of the population lives in poverty and many Haitians 
are struggling to escape to the United States.  Clearly, Haiti desperately needs aid to 
develop its economy and alleviate its poverty.   
The U.S. State Department argues that the magnitude of ever increasing levels of 
drug trafficking “threatens the stability and integrity of Haitian institutions and will ruin 
countless lives in Haiti and elsewhere.”7  Widespread corruption linked to drug 
trafficking severely undermines democratic institutions in Haiti, as well as many other 
nations in the region.  Mounting street crimes and violence fueled by economic distress 
and drug trafficking leaves many Haitians insecure and vulnerable.  Drug trafficking 
threatens to corrupt the basic institutions of Haiti, including the police, judiciary and 
government.  Furthermore, drug trafficking directly threatens the United States’ national 
security interests. 
Haiti’s geographic location, political culture, a large number of illegal 
immigrants, entrepreneurial class and weak institutions are factors that make this country 
an ideal place from which to traffic in drugs.  As a result, Haiti has become a major 
transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine, to the United States from South 
America.  Haiti’s weak democratic institutions, dysfunctional judicial system and 
fledgling police force present South America drug traffickers with a path of little 
resistance.  Moreover, many experts suspect that high-ranking government officials, 
judiciary and police are tolerating or are directly involved in the drug trafficking.   
Finally, the thesis examines how Haiti and the United States combat drug 
trafficking in Haiti and how the trafficking impacts U.S. national security.  Haiti and the 
international community face enormous challenges.  The government of Haiti is aware of 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
International Narcotic Control Strategy Report, 2000. March 1, 2001.  Available on-line. 
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/889.htm  [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 03/06/2002]  
3 
the nation’s status as a principal transit zone for drugs moving to North America; 
however, their counternarcotics efforts are secondary to more crucial matters of political 
stability, public order, and economic development.   
To trace drug trafficking in Haiti and the government efforts to combat it, the 
thesis examines the following questions:  
§ What role has Haiti played in international drug trafficking since the 
transition to democracy in 1994? 
§ What impact does drug trafficking have on political and economic 
development in Haiti and on the United States? 
§ What are the governments of Haiti and the United States doing to combat 
drug trafficking?  What more could be done? 
The methodology of this paper will be inductive, thereby drawing extensively 
from available empirical data and pub lications on Haiti and the Caribbean region.  
Additionally, other sources will include, but are not limited to, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), World Bank publications, 
periodicals, and other unclassified sources. 
Chapter II discusses Haiti’s role in international drug trafficking since 1994 when 
its democracy began.  This chapter examines the mode and evolution of drug trafficking 
since then.  The chapter further explains the reasons Haiti has became a major transit 
point for illicit drugs, emphasizing Haiti’s geo-strategic location, political culture, illegal 
immigrants, entrepreneurial class and weak democratic institutions.  Chapter II further 
shows that Haiti occupies an ideal position for drug trafficking, midway between 
Colombia and Florida, with 1,500 kilometers of coastline and an airspace free of 
surveillance.8  Since drug traffickers are aware of the inadequate defense along Haiti’s 
southern coastline, trafficking has soared, making it a major transshipment point for 
cocaine headed to the United States.  This chapter primarily focuses on the dysfunctional 
judicial system and the limited capabilities of the Haitian National Police (HNP).   
                                                 
8 Christophe Wargny.  “Haiti: Haiti’s Business Is Drugs,” LeMonde Diplomatique, 01 June 2001, v. 1, 
no. 1069.  Available on-line. http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01.n1069.a06.html [retrieved from the 
World Wide Web on 05/21/2002] 
4 
Chapter III evaluates the impact of drug trafficking on Haiti’s political and 
economic development.  As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is 
extremely vulnerable to official corruption.  Wherever the cocaine trade flourishes, drug-
related crime, corruption and violence flourish.  With the political corruption widespread 
and the economy open to the drug trade, the prospects for democratic consolidation and 
economic development will grow dimmer if national and international actors continue to 
lack the political will to formulate policy reforms tailored to Haiti’s unique social, 
economic and political situation.   
Chapter IV analyzes the bilateral efforts of the governments of Haiti and the 
United States to combat drug trafficking.  Haiti is doing what it can to cooperate with 
U.S. officials and firing corrupt police officers, but it lacks the resources and the 
necessary intelligence information to combat drugs trafficking adequately.  More 
importantly, years of political impasse prevent Haiti from taking effective action. 
According to its annual interna tional narcotics report in 1998, the U.S. State Department 
directly linked the country’s political deadlock with drug trafficking.  Combating drug 
trafficking through Haiti remains one of the highest priorities of the United States.  
Despite years of U.S. assistance totaling billions of dollars, Haiti remains a major drug 
transshipment point in the Caribbean, transporting huge shipments of cocaine from 
Colombia to the United States.   
Cocaine makes its way to the United States and destroys American lives.  The 
U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that over 52,000 drug-
related deaths occur in the U.S. every year, and that over half of our nation’s young 
people try illegal drugs before finishing high school. 9  To disrupt the flow of illegal 
drugs, the U.S. depends upon cooperation with other countries such as Haiti.   Chapter IV 
discusses Haiti’s efforts to fight drugs, including reforming the judiciary, developing a 
national narcotics plan and implementing¾narcotics laws, such as asset forfeiture and 
money-laundering legislation.   
                                                 
9 John L. Mica. “The Emerging Drug Threat from Haiti,” Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform, Chairman John L. Mica, opening 
statement. April 12, 2000.  Available on-line.  
http://www.house.gov/reform/cj/hearings/00.04.12/Witlist.htm   [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 
02/28/2002] 
5 
Chapter V provides a conclusion and recommends areas for future research.  In 
particular, serious resources and training deficits must be corrected before Haiti’s law 
enforcement can impede and diminish drug trafficking effectively.  Many initiatives have 
been implemented to combat drug trafficking within and outside of Haiti.  Since Haiti’s 
restoration of democracy, the United States has focused much of its aid on improving 
public security, rule of law, and respect for human rights by bolstering the Haitian 
judiciary and newly created Haitian National Police (HNP).  However, Haiti still has a 





















































II. HAITI’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING 
The drug trade learned long ago that where political will is weak it can 
establish a modus vivendi with a government.  Trafficking organizations 
as a matter of course will absorb losses in a given area if their overall 
operations in other areas are profitable.  This is the cost of doing business. 
  ¾International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 
The Caribbean has been an important transit zone for drugs entering the United 
States from South America.  Drugs are transported through the region through a wide 
variety of routes and methods.  Drug traffickers have taken advantage of Haiti’s location, 
weak institutions and novice police force.  Haiti has played a major role in international 
drug trafficking since its attempted transition to democracy beginning in 1994.  The 
dysfunctional judicial system and the limited capabilities of the Haitian National Police 
(HNP) are the focus of attent ion. 
A. PATTERNS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING  
1. Mode of Trafficking 
Cocaine enters Haiti through hundreds of miles of unguarded coastlines from the 
Caribbean Sea.  By speedboat, Haiti’s southern shore is only eight hours away from the 
Colombian coast.  According to the White House Office on National Drug Control 
Policy, more than 65 metric tons of cocaine is dropped in Haiti from boats or airplanes 
before being shipped to the United States through couriers or on freighters that dock on 
the Miami River.   
The primary method for smuggling cocaine into Haiti is on maritime vessels.  
“Go-fast boats (small launches with powerful motors), bulk cargo freighters, and 
containerized cargo vessels are the most common conveyances for moving large 
quantities of cocaine through the region.”10  Thus, go-fast boats from Colombia remain 
the most common maritime trafficking method—usually transiting from the Guajira 
                                                 
10 Michael S. Virgil. “DEA Congressional Testimony.” Special Agent in Charge of Caribbean Field 
Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, testimony before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resource. April 12, 2000. Available 
on-line. http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041200.htm [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 
02/27/2002] 
8 
Peninsula to destinations along Haiti’s poorly guarded southern coast.  Colombian drug 
traffickers are also often equipped with satellite assisted Global Positioning System 
devices to allow them to locate delivery sites, typically, dropping their cocaine from 
airplanes into the hills or on beaches with speedboats.11   
Traffickers also routinely transport cocaine from Colombia to Haiti in a single-or 
twin-engine aircraft to clandestine landing strips, or airdrop loads of cocaine to waiting 
vehicles or boats.  Other common conveyances for smuggling cocaine into Haiti include 
fishing vessels and couriers on commercial aircraft.  The cocaine couriers transport 
cocaine by concealing small quantities of cocaine on their person or in their baggage or 
even by ingesting the product.  Commercial airline flights from Panama are yet another 
route of cocaine shipments.  By July 1998, at least five substantial cocaine shipments had 
been seized at the Port-au-Prince airport after arriving in untagged baggage aboard COPA 
airline flights from Panama.  A U.S. official says that “Haiti’s role is to provide a 
commercial service” for the Colombians and the Dominicans or to move it (cocaine) 
through the Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas.12  As cocaine enters Haiti, it is usually 
stored locally until it can be shipped to the United States or to other international markets.   
Cocaine is often smuggled out of Haiti in containerized cargo or on bulk cargo 
freighters directly to Miami.  The cocaine shipments aboard cargo freighters are 
occasionally offloaded to smaller vessels and then transported to the Continental, United 
States (CONUS).  From Haiti, cocaine is also transferred overland through the porous 
275-kilometer borders to the Dominican Republic for further transshipment to Puerto 
Rico, the CONUS, Europe, and Canada.13  Once in Haiti, transporting the cocaine to the 
Dominican Republic is very easy, given the rugged terrain and the few police stations.  
                                                 
11 Douglas Farah. “Flow of Colombian Cocaine through Haiti Turns to Flood.” Washington Post, 
Tuesday, May 4, 1999; Page A11. Available on-line. http://www.rose-
hulman.edu/~delacova/haiti/cocaine.htm [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 03/18/2002] 
12 Don. Bohning. “Haiti a Haven for Drug-traffickers.” Miami Herald, July 20, 1998. Available on-
line. http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/haiti/haiti-drugs.htm  [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 
02/24/2002]. 
13 Virgil, April 12, 2000. 
9 
Dominican and Colombian drug traffickers then share the distribution work to move the 
cocaine to the United States.14 
 Marijuana destined for Haiti is usually transported from Jamaica on go-fast boats 
and other maritime vessels.  Sometimes cocaine in lesser amounts might arrive and leave 
in freighters transiting the Caribbean, but cocaine frequently leaves in Miami-bound 
vessels.15  
2. Evolution of Drug Trafficking 
In the early 1980s, under authoritarian rule, the drug trade in Haiti was the 
province of a few corrupt military men associated with the father- in- law of dictator, Jean-
Claude Duvalier.  When the Reagan administration actively pursued a policy against the 
Colombian cartels and intensified interdiction programs with the Bahamas and the Turks 
and Caicos Islands, Haiti became the alternative site of operation.  Furthermore, since the 
United States had withdrawn most of its aid to Haiti, and since the government of Jean 
Claude Duvalier was about to collapse, the Colombian drug dealers easily invaded the 
weakened and corrupt governmental system.16  This provided the means for some 
government and military officials to capitalize on drug trafficking.   
According to one Haitian security expert, Haiti emerged significantly onto the 
international drug-trafficking scene in 1985.17  Drug traffickers took advantage of Haiti’s 
location, weak institutions and novice police force, turning this country into a major 
transshipment point for cocaine on route from Colombia to United States.  That is when 
the cocaine cartels began to seek transit points for the booming cocaine industry.   
The period between 1985 and 1987 witnessed the consolidation of networks used 
by the Colombian drug traffickers.  The drug traffickers used several different and 
complementary strategies in Haiti.  These strategies included “purchasing legal 
businesses in Haiti for use as front operations, buying protection from military officers, 
                                                 
14 Bohning, July 20, 1998. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ivelaw L. Griffith.  Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege .  (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.), p. 74. 
17 Ibid. 
10 
recruiting military officers as associates and using Haitian territory as a base for 
trafficking and storage operations.”18   
By 1987, the commander of Haiti’s police was collaborating in the transshipment 
of tons of cocaine, according to testimony by Gabriel Toboada of the Medellin cartel 
before a U.S. Senate Foreign Rela tions Committee in April 1994.  In 1987 alone, the 
police commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Michel Francois, received from one to 
four million dollars to protect Colombian cocaine shipments.19  Toboada also testified 
that Francois helped build an airstrip on the property of Jean Claude Paul, Haitian 
colonel, as a landing pad for airplanes loaded with Colombian cocaine.  South America 
drug traffickers used Haiti as a bridge to the United States, with the Haitian military 
providing a cover for the flights and the cargo.  As a result of Gabriel Toboada’s 
testimony, indictments for drug trafficking were handed down in Miami against Francois 
on March 7, 1997.20  “The indictment alleges that Francois was trusted to courier 
millions of dollars in illicit profits from Medellin, Baranquilla, and Cali cartels to pay off 
the military for use of the private airstrip, supervised off- loading operations, and arranged 
for storage facilities and the transfer of narcotics to maritime vessels and aircraft in Haiti 
for importation into the United States.”21 
By the early 1990s, cocaine seizures in Haiti were increasing.  A lawless 
partnership in drug trafficking had been formed between the police, the military and 
government officials.  When a 1991 coup put Francois in power, cocaine seizures in Haiti 
dropped to near zero.  According to the DEA, in 1993, approximately two to four tons of 
cocaine passed through Haiti with the consent of military officials.  Each year under the 
military junta, Haiti was the transit point for nearly 50 tons of cocaine worth over a 
billion dollars, providing the military rulers with $200 million in profits.  Francois fled to 
the Dominican Republic with the return of the democratically elected government in 
October 1994.    
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
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IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.), p. 175. 
20 Griffith, p. 74. 
21 Stotzky, p. 175. 
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B. FIVE FACTORS AFFECTING DRUG TRAFFICKING 
Countries involved in drug trafficking often demonstrate some or all of the 
following characteristics: a strategic geographical location between producing and 
consuming countries, a political culture that tolerates corruption, a large number of illegal 
immigrants living outside the territorial limits of the nation-state, a country’s powerful 
entrepreneurial class and institutional weakness.22  Haiti, the small and poverty-stricken 
nation that occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, meets all five criteria.  
This next section discusses how Haiti is an example of these five factors in various ways, 
making it deeply vulnerable to drug trafficking. 
1. Geographical Location and Size  
Geography and size have a tendency to influence the nature and direction of the 
flow of drug trafficking and illicit activities.  Haiti is located strategically on 
internationally trade routes and has attracted the attention of those involved in 
commercial enterprises of drugs.  Geographically, Haiti is strategically located between 
the major drug producers in South America and United States, which is the world’s 
largest drug-consuming country.  As Figure 1 shows, Haiti sits on the eastern side of the 
Windward Passage, one of the most important maritime routes in the hemisphere.  Haiti 
is particularly attractive to drug trafficking because of its direct route from the Colombian 
coast to Florida.  Port-au-Prince is approximately 500 miles north of Colombia and 700 
miles from Miami.  Furthermore, Haiti and the Dominican Republic maintain an 
extremely porous frontier.  Haiti’s attraction to drug traffickers is the dozens of small 
airstrips, lack of patrols of Haiti’s airspace and lack of radar monitoring of the country.  
“All these factors make Haiti an ideal transshipment point for drugs into the United 
States.”23   
 
 
                                                 
22 Griffith, p. 139. 
23 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Figure 1.    Maritime Drug Trafficking Routes in the Americas 24 
 
                                                 
24 Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). “Supply Reduction: Maritime 
Cooperation.”  November 20, 2001. Available on-line. 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/es/Oferta/Maritime%20Cooperation.htm [retrieved from the World Wide Web on 
04/10/2002] 
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2. Political Culture  
The reason some countries are vulnerable to illicit enterprises is that their political 
culture provides a conducive atmosphere for illicit activities.25  Understood as the pattern 
of beliefs and attitudes about politics, a nation’s political culture influences greatly the 
atmosphere in which illicit activities are permitted.  The nature of elite political culture is 
important in shaping the behavior of business and government elites.  Indeed, an elite 
political culture that permits corruption breeds drug trafficking.  Traditionally, Haiti 
political culture sees the state in which illicit activities are common as a means of 
personal enrichment.  In an atmosphere where illegal and corrupt practices are openly 
engaged, the peasants are drawn into illicit activities as a means of survival.  The state’s 
ability to fight illegal activities is vastly decreased under these circumstances.   
More importantly, in Haiti a deeply engrained, 200-year tradition of predation to 
has contributed to the rise of the drug trade.26  Haiti’s culture of predation has fostered 
autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and economic stagnation all of which 
are conducive to illicit activities.27  Every Haitian politician wants to be president or 
wants to secure his share of the rewards; politicians have always used the state as a 
mechanism to extract wealth to benefit the elites.28  Altering the attitude and values of 
Haitian will require at least a generation of effort.29   
3. Large Number of Emigrants 
Migration also influences a nation’s involvement in illicit activities.  A large 
emigrant group living in a drug-consuming nation offers a prime disbursal network for 
illegal exports, yet simultaneously, the money sent by the diasporas to their native 
country benefits the economy of the native country as well.    
Haitian immigrants, most of whom are law-abiding citizens, live outside of Haiti 
and have tremendously influence on Haitian politics and economics.  They sent home 
                                                 
25 Griffith, p. 140. 
26 Donald E. Schulz. Haiti Update.  Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 1997. Available on-line. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/hatiup/hatiup.htm 
[retrieved from the World Wide Web on 02/05/2002], p. 14. 
27 Griffith, p. 141-42. 
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over $100 million to families and relatives during the military coup.30  However, among 
the Haitian diasporas living in cities, such as New York, Miami, and Chicago, there are 
also members of Front of the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), the civilian 
arm of the military regime, who began to import terror into the United States in 1994.  
These FRAPH leaders were accused by the U.S. State Department of being involved in a 
variety of corrupt practices, including drug trafficking.  In the U.S., FRAPH members 
served as a convenient network for the importation of drugs into the country. 31 
Although some diaspora Haitians returned to Haiti after the U.S. intervention in 
1994 to restore the country’s first democratically elected president, many remained in the 
United States.  Some FRAPH members stayed because of Haiti’s continued economic 
problems while others were integral part of the illicit activity network.  Haiti’s custom 
checks and import duties were relaxed after the intervention to encourage the rapid 
replenishment of goods from abroad.  As a consequence, Haiti was more porous than 
before.   
4. Haiti’s Entrepreneurial Class 
A nation’s entrepreneurship class has a major effect on a country’s involvement in 
drug trafficking and other illegal activities.32  Drug traffickers tend to operate on short-
term and high profits.  Consequently, globalization has created a free-for-all in which 
organized crime secure high payoffs with little risk from law enforcement.  While Haiti’s 
leaders rhetorically condemn the drug trade and the accompanying crime, many are 
deeply involved in these illicit activities.  A Colombian Fernando Burgos Martinez 
national with major business interests in Haiti has been identified in congressional 
records as a major cocaine trafficker bold enough to conduct business with other 
Colombian drug dealers on his home telephone.33  Martinez was the bagman for 
Colombia’s cocaine cartels and supervised bribes paid to the Haitian military.  According 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 13. 
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31 Ibid. 
32 Griffith, p. 140 
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to the DEA, Martinez was involved in every major drug shipment to Haiti between 1987 
and 1994.  Drug trafficking in Haiti was just another profitable business.   
5. Institutional Weakness 
Institutional weakness allows a country to be a haven for drug traffickers. Haiti 
has made some progress in combating drugs, yet the lack of an effective judicial system 
seriously impedes progress.  Even today, prisons hold criminals for years without trial 
and under inhuman conditions.  The judicial system still lacks resources, competent 
judges, and the credibility to serve its people effectively and justly.  Furthermore, by 
exploiting their positions in exchange for money or other benefits, state officials support 
criminal illicit activities.   
Since its independence in 1804, the Haitian state “has been extremely weak vis-à-
vis elements of the economic and political elite and has been used by the elites as a 
means to acquire personal wealth.”34  For these reasons, Haiti has been classified as a 
“prebendary state,” one in which a political class lives off politics.35  Throughout Haitian 
history an educated urban and mostly mulatto elite has used the political system to 
become wealthy.  They paid little taxes or customs duties and were able to manipulate the 
ambitious military leaders they placed in office.  The two state institutions most 
important for combating the drug trade¾the judicial system and the police force¾are 
particularly weak in Haiti.   
a. Judicial System 
  To dismantle the predatory state, Haiti needs to foster a universal respect 
for the rule of law to help create a successful democratic state.  An underlying problem is 
Haiti’s judicial system.  Haiti lacks the law enforcement capacity to challenge drug 
traffickers.  The government is completely dysfunctional and distrusted by the populace.  
Haitians’ respect for the rule of law will require a justice system that works and applies to 
all people equally.  William O’Neill and Marguerite Laurent outlined the following 
obstacles Haiti faces in accomplishing this task:   
                                                 
34 Griffith, p. 141. 
35 See Alex DuPuy. Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.) on aspects of the prebendary state.  
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· Unequal Access to Justice: Most of the population has no access to the 
courts or legal representation; 
· Uninhabitable Courthouses and Prisons: The physical condition of 
courthouses, prisons, and administrative buildings is deplorable;  
· Illiterate, Corrupt, and Untrained Judges: Many of the justice of the peace 
where most of the population has its first contact with the judicial system 
were found to be illiterate and simply contrives the law;  
· Lack of Due Process: Haitian law still follows French law of allowing for 
public denunciation although this practice was abolished long ago in 
France;  
· Vigilante Justice: Instant executions have occurred, but not on the scale 
that some had predicted.  Forty cases of human rights violations were 
documented in March of 1995, and an additional eighteen cases were 
documented in July of the same year.36   
The problems of the judicial system are mind-boggling.  One observer stated that: 
Haitian justice lacks everything: financial resources, materials, competent 
personnel, independence, stature and trust.  Court facilities are a disgrace, 
courthouses often indistinguishable from small shops or run-down 
residences in Haitian cities and towns.  Judges and prosecutors, ill-trained 
and often chosen because of their  connections or willingness to comply 
with their benefactors’ demands, dispense justice to the highest bidder or 
to the most powerful.  No judge or prosecutor in Haiti, until mid-1995, had 
received any specialized professional training.  Law schools are woefully 
inadequate and lack the most rudimentary necessities like decent 
classrooms and a law library; cronyism reigns, professors are ill trained, 
student’s ill prepared, passing grades bought and sold.37 
  Haiti’s justice system failed to address these and other human rights 
concerns.  The Haitian Parliament passed a judicial reform law in May 1998 to eliminate 
corrupt or incompetent judges and prosecutors, training new ones, distributing law books 
                                                 
36 Robert I. Rotberg.  Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects. (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997.), p. 16-17. 
37 Schulz, p. 16-17. 
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and so on.  As a result, the judicial system and police force are critically disconnected.  It 
will not matter much whether the police can apprehend criminals if the courts cannot 
process them or the jails cannot hold them.  The immense failings of the justice system 
demoralize the citizens as well as the few honest police who exist.    
   The dysfunctional judicial system is rife with low pay, bribery, lack of 
training, intimidation and assassination plots.  As a result, many judges choose to protect 
their lives instead of upholding the law.  In instances where the law is applied, powerful, 
corrupt groups, including police officers, manage to overturn verdicts, free convicted 
criminals and even assault judges. The judiciary still lacks resources, competent judges 
and the necessary credibility to serve its people, making the public feel hopeless and 
mistrusting. The inability of the legal system to address crime properly has further 
alienated people.  Consequently, the dysfunctional judicial system routinely protects 
criminals whose violence is so intimidating that it discourages the reform of a crumbling 
legal order.   
b. Haitian National Police 
  Haiti’s army was disbanded in 1994, and replaced by a fledgling police 
force that is ill equipped to deter drug trafficking.  Consequently, it is difficult for police 
to fight the cocaine trade, and “drug traffickers try to use, infiltrate and corrupt the police, 
so it is a double battle.”38  Since 1994, through UN and U.S. assistance, approximately 
6,000 members of the Police Nationale d’Haiti (PNH) have been retrained and supplied.  
To date, this has cost $50 million. 39  Yet, the police still have not earned the confidence 
of prominent politicians or the general Haitian society.  People have criticized the 
police’s inexperience, lack of leadership and inadequate basic-training period (of only 
four months.)  With at least 75 murders a month and a steady increase in drug-related 
activities, hoping that the police force will have a chance to restore law and order is 
dubious.   
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  The middle and upper levels of the new police are sorely lacking in 
experience and many instances of corruption and human rights abuse remained Haiti’s 
most pressing problems during 1998.  The United Nations and Organization of American 
States International Civilian Mission in Haiti reported 13 killings by police using 
excessive force just during the beginning of 1998.  The mission confirmed 150 reports of 
police brutality from January to May 1998.  Police brutality included cases in which 
police officers burned suspects with cigarettes or nearly suffocated them.40  This kind of 
police violence angered the public, sparking several retaliatory attacks.  For example, in a 
protest in mid-1998, the citizens burned tires, damaged the police station, and freed 
detainees from jails.  In addition, some Haitians are uneasy about former members of the 
Army being allowed to be part of the new police force.  If these soldiers are not retrained 
and if the new government is not vigilant, an additional form of corruption could emerge, 
for these military personnel could easily become as corrupt as the police.41   
  Indeed, all has not been well within the HNP, “There are growing reports 
of police violence, incompetence and graft, and a corresponding sharp decline in public 
support for the institution.”42  The Miami Herald reported that about 60 officers were 
suspended for misconduct in November 1996.  In January 1997, a coalition of human 
rights groups said that members of the HNP force have committed serious abuses, 
including torture and summary execution and continued violations would raise doubts 
about the training and leadership of the police force.   The HNP also suffers attrition and 
recruitment problems.  Little money has been provided for training, equipment, vehicle 
maintenance, fuel, and other necessities.   
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  The lack of pay and training are reasons for the “involvement of the police 
in illicit activities, such as drug trafficking in order to supplement their income.”43  
Corruption and the abuse of power continue within the force and a number of police 
personnel have been arrested for drug-related offenses.  Additionally, the HNP dismissed 
approximately 100 police officers in 1998 for drug-related corruption, compared with less 
than ten officers in 1997.44  According to the State Department’s annual assessment of 
the global drug trade, none of those officers has been prosecuted. 
  Police morale continues to decline amid the turbulence Haitian society.  
The officers suffer from a shortage of communication equipment, vehicles, fuel and other 
equipment necessary to perform their job effectively.  This situation has restricted the 
operational efficacy of the police force.  Moreover, when Aristide returned to power in 
2000, he replaced carefully vetted U.S.-trained officers with Lavalas Family loyalists, 
which only worsened the situation.   
  This decrease in assistance and in resources presented serious problems 
for the HNP’s counternarcotics efforts.  Changes in the HNP leadership following the 
February 2001 inauguration of President Aristide led to ramifications at lower levels, 
which further undermined the HNP’s ability to combat the drug problem. For example, 
Mario Andresol was removed as Chief of the Judicial Police (DPCJ), the HNP arm 
responsible for counternarcotics operations.  No permanent Chief of the DPCJ was 
appointed by the close of 2001. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Drug trafficking emerged in Haiti around 1985 and the primary method of 
smuggling cocaine was on maritime vessels.  Several factors facilitated drug trafficking 
in Haiti: geographic location, poorly monitored coasts, a mountainous interior, about 
twenty unpatrolled airstrips, inadequate law-enforcement resources, and a culture that is 
conducive to corruption.  Taking advantage of Haiti’s location and weak institutions, 
drug traffickers have turned the country into a major transshipment center for cocaine on 
route from Colombia to the United States.  
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Haiti’s outdated and inefficient judicial system continues to impede prompt and 
fair trials.  Haiti also lacks the law enforcement capacity to challenge drug traffickers, for 
Haiti’s fledgling police force is ill equipped and ill trained to deter drug trafficking.  
Furthermore, police involvement in numerous drug scandals has damaged the public 
confidence in the force.  In sum, Haiti lacks the law enforcement capacity to challenge 









III. IMPACT OF DRUG TRAFFICKING ON HAITI’S POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
For over 200 years Haiti has “never known a period free of tyranny, repression, 
political conflict, racial animosity, and economic hardship.”45  Haiti is a classic predatory 
state, preying on its people without providing political or economic goods.  The lack of 
accountability has allowed the governments to use their power to destroy rather than 
develop the state.  In the late 1990s, Haiti’s task was to dismantle the remnants of the 
predatory state and replace it with a democratic government that could respond to the 
needs of the nation, alleviating poverty, creating the basic for sustained economic growth 
and development, and providing justice and security for all.  Such goals are not easily 
achieved.  A major obstacle to political stability, economic development and the 
consolidation of democracy is the trafficking of drugs through Haiti.  Haiti's burgeoning 
cocaine trade is corroding the country's already weak institutions and undermining its 
fragile democracy.  The government of Haiti has been confronted with many obstacles, 
including extensive corruption, weak institutions and scarce resources.   
This chapter evaluates the impact of drug trafficking on Haiti’s political and 
economic development after the 1994 U.S. led intervention.  As the previous chapters 
showed, Haiti’s history of political and economic instability has increased its 
attractiveness as a significant transit point for drug trafficking, and owing to Haiti’s lack 
of a functioning judicial system and credible law enforcement, traffickers feel safe from 
arrest and prosecution.  As a result, drug-related crime, violence, and corruption have 
increased, threatening Haiti’s fragile democracy.  While some progress has been made in 
curtailing these problems since the multinational 1994 intervention, the political situation 
remains extremely fragile and volatile and the prospects for economic development are 
more problematic because of the high levels of drug trafficking.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The political and economic history of Haiti reveals a country that has always 
suffered from a corrupt elite, economic underdevelopment, and the lack of political 
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democracy.  The increase in drug trafficking prior to the 1994 restoration of democracy 
and the persistence of drug trafficking into the 21st century has only exacerbated these 
problems of a lack of democratic consolidation and economic underdevelopment linked 
to elite corruption.  This section provides an overview of Haiti’s problematic past.  The 
chapter then highlights how drug trafficking presents obstacles to efforts to consolidate 
democracy and develop the economy.   
Haiti gained its independence on from France January 1, 1804. Between the years 
of 1791 and 1804, a revolutionary war between the Haitian and the French destroyed 
much of the plantation economy and countryside uprooting the European class.  After the 
struggle, French colonists and nearly all the Europeans were driven out.  Left were the 
free people of color (mostly mulattoes).46   
During the early years of Haitian independence, the bourgeoisie began to profit 
from the productive efforts of the agrarian masses to enhance their own personal wealth.  
This resulted in zero expansion of domestic production.  Without a strong political and 
economic infrastructure, Haiti became the poorest state in the Americas and is still the 
poorest to this day.     
In 1915, the United States occupied Haiti and dissolved the political institutions, 
which were not reformed until 1934.  However, the Americans, in trying to reform the 
political system, did little to stabilize the local politics, and when they departed little had 
improved in Haitian life.   
Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier was elected president in 1957, winning the election 
by appealing to nationalism, racism, and voodoo.  Duvalier revolutionized Haitian 
politics, but he deepened the structure of corruption in the process by creating his own 
private army of thugs known as the “Tontons Macoutes.”47  Displaced from state politics, 
the private sector of the old mulatto elite continued its habits of avoiding taxes, 
corrupting public officials and draining capital from the economy.  Under Jean-Claude 
“Baby Doc” Duvalier, this private sector corruption eventually began to function 
symbiotically with corruption in the public sector.  Thus corruption became the essential 
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link between the public and private sectors.  There was an increase in corruption among 
the Duvaliers and the Bennetts (Jean-Claude’s wife’s family), which included drug 
trafficking in narcotics.48   
In February 1986, amid rising economic, political, and social discontent, Jean-
Claude Duvalier was overthrown.  The Armed Forces Chief, General Henri Namphy 
assumed control and political power quickly reverted to the army.  The drug business 
involved government agencies devoted to “public service,” and government corporations, 
such as the Port Authority (which controls imports and exports as well as access to both 
military and international airports) and a state-owned flourmill.   
The drug business became the ‘engine’ that drove the military and 
overwhelmed the island’s commerce, providing the basis for generalized 
smuggling and a brisk money laundering operation. 49   
Individual senior military officers were encouraged to find extra work to supplement their 
income outside the institution, so they became involved in the illicit drug trade to 
supplement their income.  By the mid–1980s, Haitian military leaders were deeply linked 
to the drug trade.50 
The elections scheduled for November 1987 were annulled in the midst of state-
sponsored riots and subsequent repression.  A political scientist, Leslie Manigat, was 
named president after fraudulent elections were held in January 1988.  That government 
lasted only five months with the military continuing its repressive rule until February 
1991.  The military regime scheduled another round of elections for December 1990, and 
Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the presidency. 
Aristide ruled for seven months.  During these months, he made significant efforts 
to restructure the Haitian military.  Aristide realized that any reforms in the public 
administration and the economy would not be easy unless he first neutralized the 
prebendary state system. This would mean reforming the military and dismantling its 
allied paramilitary organization.  Aristide replaced several top-ranking officers who had 
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controlled the armed forces under past regimes with new officers thought to be more 
supportive of democratization.  Col. Raoul Cedras was among the presumed reform 
minded officers, the leader of the coup that eventually ousted Aristide in September 
1991.   
The reforms were designed to separate the army from the police, disarm the 
paramilitary organization, and dismantle the system of section chiefs in the rural sector.  
Although the Aristide government did not succeed fully in implementing the military 
reforms, Aristide made significant strides in combating corruption, contraband activities, 
drug trafficking, and human right abuses.  In February 1991, the government established 
an inter-ministerial commission with a second commission being established in August to 
investigate and bring to justice those accused of crimes between 1986 and 1990.  Aristide 
also replaced several Supreme Court justices and many other judges in the countryside.51   
Angered by Aristide’s attacks against corruption and drug trafficking, the military 
hierarchy was worried that the relations between the Aristide government and the U.S. 
Embassy in Haiti would lead to greater drug enforcement activities in the country 
according to Orlando J. Perez, a specialist on Central America politics.  In response, Col 
Raoul Cedras launched the September 30,1991 military coup that ousted Aristide.   
In November 1992, the UN and the Organization of America States (OAS) 
implemented an economic embargo on Haiti.  Despite the embargo, there were many 
reports of drugs being trafficked through Haiti.  For example the U.S. Coast Guard 
discovered 100 pound of cocaine on board a Haitian freighter on the Miami River on 
April 15, 1993.  Failing to remove the Haitian military from power by tightening 
economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, President Clinton was under increasing 
domestic and international pressure to act militarily.  Former President Jimmy Carter, 
retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia negotiated the terms of 
the junta’s departure, as a UN sponsored invasion force was on route to the island.  
Aristide was welcomed back to Haiti on October 15, 1994. 
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B. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION  
Dankwart Rustow says that consolidation encompasses:  
Habituation in which the norms, procedures, and expectations of 
democracy become so internalized that actors routinely, instinctively 
conform to the written rules of the game, even when they conflict and 
compete intensely. 52   
This routine commitment to democracy at the elite and public level is a crucial 
element of consolidation.  Democracy is consolidated in a country when no significant 
collective actors challenge the legitimacy of the democratic institutions or regularly 
violate its constitutional norms, procedures, and laws.53  Democracies have their share of 
extremists and rejectionists, but these anti-democrats must be marginal.  However, 
democracies are not consolidated when supporters of rival parties frequently kill and 
terrorize one another in a quest for power.   
To be sure, no democratic regime is ever fully consolidated in the “utopian” 
sense, yet democratic consolidation is regarded as the crystallization of democratic 
structures and norms that become accepted as legitimate by the majority of a civil 
society.  When consolidation has been achieved, a democratic regime’s stability and 
long-term prospects for survival are greatly enhanced.   
Haiti remains strangled by the turmoil induced by a paralyzed political system, a 
debilitated economy, and drug trafficking, all of which have hindered democratization.  
Haiti faces a threat to the development of its democratic institutions because it lacks the 
political will to implement reforms. The political crisis and corruption has undermined 
enforcement morale and explains the unsteady development of democracy in Haiti.  
Drug-related corruption within the police force, the justice sector, customs and port 
officials are enormous because drug traffickers have targeted all branches of the 
government responsible for supervising Haiti’s airports, seaports and border-crossing 
points with the Dominican Republic.   
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The lack of an effective judicial reform is a further obstacle for democracy.  The 
government’s failure to crush drug trafficking has only added to the crisis of the judicial 
system.  This is not only a fact, but also a common public perception.  The detention 
centers hold prisoners for years without a trial and under inhuman conditions.  Haiti’s 
judiciary lacks the resources, competent judges and the credibility to serve its people.  
This dysfunctional judicial system continues routinely to protect criminals whose 
violence discourages any legal reforms.  Powerful groups, including corrupt police 
officers, often overturn verdicts, free convicted criminals, and assault judges in the rare 
instances where the law has been applied.  The legal system’s inability to address the 
drug-fueled crime wave further alienates the public, making citizens more and more 
distrusting of the legal system. 
Another important issue undermining democratic consolidation in Haiti is that of 
security.  The security concerns are largely from an internal threat of a prevailing culture 
of violence.  This problem is so severe that normal political activity can result in 
widespread violence.  The widespread drug trade only contributes to this culture of 
violence.  The Haitian government cannot provide the basic necessities for its citizens 
much less their security, according to an Amnesty International report released in 
September 2001.  Respect for human rights and the rule of law has fallen to its lowest 
point since democracy was restored in 1994.54   
The massive Caribbean drug trade undermines democratization by corrupting the 
fledgling police force and traditionally weak judicial system, two institutions crucial for a 
viable democracy. 55  Additionally, those who participated in repression of the Haitian 
people in the past cont inue to find funding in drug trafficking.  In effect, “the drug trade 
empowers sectors within Haiti that are vociferously opposed to democratic transition.”56  
Thus, the prospects for democracy are dim due to the lack of political will to implement 
policy reforms.  The Haitian government must build and strengthen its institutions to 
correct these persistent threats, and if such measures are not taken, Haiti could easily 
                                                 
54 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment –Central America and the Caribbean . 




revert to lawlessness and misrule, which might trigger another international military 
intervention. 57  Although Haiti’s democratic consolidation is hampered severely by drug 
trafficking, its poor economic performance poses a further equally destructive threat to 
democratic transition. 
C. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT   
Historically, the most fundamental problem of the Haitian economy has been 
economic mismanagement and corruption. 58  Today, drug trafficking and the associated 
corruption continue to undermine Haiti’s struggle to rebuild it economy.  In turn, the lack 
of economic development also contributes to the violence and political instability in 
Haiti. 
The three years of terror, neglect and international sanctions during the military 
junta (1991-1994) reduced Haiti’s per capita income.  Haiti has consistently been the 
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and its poverty has only worsened.  Wealth 
continues to be concentrated in the hands of the elite who have profited from monopolies, 
an unfair system of taxation and other activities designed to benefit the privileged at the 
expense of the vast majority of Haitians.   
Under the corrupt Cedras regime, military officers appropriated about 40 percent 
of the national budget.59  Drug trafficking operations became increasingly widespread 
and brought in tens of millions of dollars.  Drug trafficking profited virtually everyone 
from the military’s high command to the lowest level officers.  Powerful military-
business alliances dominated the country’s economic activities and controlled Haiti’s 
imports.   
Even when the military institution was disestablished with the return of 
democracy in 1994, the prospects for economic development were doubtful.  Only the 
assembly-manufacturing sector had any hope of attaining economic prosperity.  
Unfortunately, this sector now lies in ruins because of the military repression and 
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international sanctions.60  Yet even if this sector is restored, according to Donald E. 
Schulz, it will not create enough jobs to absorb the expanding work force.  Therefore, the 
task in Haiti is less a matter of economic recovery or restoration than starting all over 
from scratch with little human capital and a long history of waste and corruption. 61 
The illegal drug trade is undermining Haiti’s struggle to rebuild its shattered 
economy. Given Haiti’s violent past and its uncertain future, few citizens are willing to 
invest in the economy because they are afraid of losing their money.  Likewise, foreign 
investors are unwilling to invest while the UN troops are necessary for maintaining order.  
Security is important to foreign investors and they are concerned about what will happen 
once the UN troops leaves Haiti.  Although there are many reasons for the lack of foreign 
investment, including governmental delays in implementing privatization laws and other 
free market reform, it is important not to underestimate the role that drug-related 
corruption and violence play in undermining investor confidence.62   
In addition, several other major economic problems arise from the presence of the 
drug trade: “The state loses substantial revenues from loss of port fees, sales taxes, and 
other levies; Haitians are being put out of business by dishonest competition; illegal 
weapons and drugs are being smuggled without government control; and the restoration 
of state authority is being undermined.”63  However, there is no easy solution to these 
problems and the Haitian government does not have the resources to carry out the battle 
against drug trafficking.  Consequently, a drug trafficking crackdown would leave many 
people at provincial ports, which are poorly equipped and where most of the unloading is 
done by hand, without jobs. 
As a result, such continuing political uncertainty has battered an already shrunken 
economy.  Local manufacturers are gone, and investor confidence is so low that people 
joke that even the drug traffickers are leaving.  Multilateral donors are suspending foreign 
aid because they feel the needed reforms will not be accomplished.  Haiti needs 
privatization and a free market with trading opportunities.  Furthermore, with their 
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average years of schooling being the lowest in the hemisphere at 1.7 years and 80 percent 
of the population impoverished, Haiti needs leaders who can envision and realized 
prosperity derived from the political and economic freedom of their countrymen. 64   
 Haiti’s principal trading partner and largest bilateral aid contributor, the United 
States, has strongly influenced Haiti’s economic performance.  After the restoration of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, Haiti implemented an economic 
program based on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, civil 
service reform, and decentralization in which the government cut tariffs to 15 percent.65   
President Rene Preval took office in March 1996 and immediately implemented a 
structural adjustment program. The amount of aid ($2 billion over three years) pledged by 
the international community for Haiti's social and economic reconstruction would 
provide Haiti with a unique opportunity to fund and to implement systemic changes that 
can foster sustained economic reform. 66   
Haiti’s external debt constrains economic reform¾ and is a contributing factor to 
the limited resources devoted to counternarcotics programs in Haiti.  Even though Haiti’s 
total debt is lower than some neighboring economies, the ratio of total debt to exports 
was at its highest in 1994, and 1995.  The external debt servicing reduces foreign 
exchange available for imports, which in turn, hinders economic growth.  In sum, Haiti, 
like other governments, sometimes economizes on resources for counternarcotics 
programs to pay debts.   
The prospects for economic development and substantively improving living 
conditions are problematic because the redistribution of economic power in favor of the 
poor is unlikely.  For example, the neo-liberal economic policies imposed on Haiti’s 
government by international donors prevent such a strategy.  Since Haiti depends on 
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foreign aid, the nation’s options are severely constrained.67  Even if the primary obstacle 
to economic development–the predatory state–ends, the remaining challenges are still 
enormous.68  With the weak institutions and long history of corruption, foreign private 
investment has not looked promising and, lacking investment, Haiti needs foreign aid.  
International donors for the Haiti Economic Recovery Program pledged 1.8 billion 
dollars over five years (1994-99).69  However, more is needed if 200 years of 
underdevelopment are to be reversed. 
Haitian unemployment rates are well over 50 percent in the cities.  In the short 
term, real economic development is unlikely, given the paralysis of political life and the 
populist tendencies of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  Consequently, the mounting street crime 
that is fueled by drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and U.S. deportation of convicted 
felons of Haitian origin, has instilled a heightened sense of insecurity on Haitians.70  
Consequently, fearful Haitians fleeing to the United States or the Dominican Republic 
will be on the rise once again.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Haiti certainly has the potential for development, but so far the leadership has 
failed to capitalize on the strengths of the nation’s hard-working people.  The 
development problems in Haiti, political more than economic, only exacerbate the 
country’s economic problems.  Haiti's ineffectual democratic and economic institutions 
have been further weakened by the political impasse in place since June 1997, 
undermining government plans for economic reform and rendering the country more 
vulnerable to drug trafficking, corruption, and money laundering.71  Much of the criminal 
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violence in Haiti is attributable to drug trafficking.72  A bleak analysis of Haiti’s political 
and socioeconomic prospects suggests that in spite of the progress that was made since 
the U.S.- led multinational intervention in September 1994, Haiti still has much work to 
do before the nation achieves democracy and economic security.  Three quarters of 
Haiti’s population lives in abject poverty.  Tremendous economic improvement much be 
achieved if Haiti’s democratization is to succeed.  Progress in the fight against drugs will 
be a necessary part of any program to create the conditions for political stability, 
economic development, and democracy. 
Undeniably, Haiti’s progress toward political stability, economic prosperity and a 
truly free democracy is hindered greatly by drug trafficking.  Illegal drugs fuel 
corruption, vice, malfeasance, and social turmoil.  Public confidence and respect for their 
leaders and institutions is destroyed by the omnipresence of the drug trade.  As a result, 
until the presence of drugs and drug dealers is sharply contained or eliminated, Haiti’s 



















                                                 
72 “Haiti: Continued Instability.” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 04 December 1997.  Available on-line. 











































IV. HAITIAN AND U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT DRUG 
TRAFFICKING 
Every year the U.S. government determines which of the major drug producing 
and drug transiting countries have cooperated fully with the United States or have taken 
adequate steps to achieve full compliance with the objectives of the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention.  In 2002, the U.S. State Department has determined that Haiti is failing to 
cooperate fully with the United States in anti-drug efforts for the fourth consecutive year.  
Haiti’s performance was evaluated for “stemming illicit cultivation, extraditing drug 
traffickers, and taking legal steps and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish 
public corruption that facilitates drug trafficking or impedes prosecution of drug-related 
crime.”73  Unfortunately, the Haitian government was criticized broadly for failing to 
take significant counter-drug actions, such as enacting asset forfeiture and anti-corruption 
legislation, as well as expanding the anti-drug unit of the national police.74  Additionally, 
the Haitian government was criticized for “showing no increase in seizures of illegal 
drugs, including cocaine, nor in the number of arrests of major traffickers.”75  Thus, Haiti 
failed to meet the statutory standard required for certification based on the goals of the 
1988 UN Drug Convention. 76  However, a cutoff of aid and assistance would threaten the 
democratic stability in Haiti; therefore aid has been certified on the basis of U.S. vital 
national interests.  Given the importance of U.S. assistance, how did Haiti fail to meet the 
U.S. drug control requirements?   
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The primary focus of this chapter rests past measures to combat illegal drug 
activity.  It will address the bilateral efforts of Haiti and the United States.  Haiti has 
made steps to adhere to measures the UN drug convention set forth.  However, Haiti’s 
counternarcotics initiatives have suffered due to a long political impasse between the 
executive and the legislature and economic instability, according to the U.S. State 
Department 2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.   
A. HAITI’S ACTIONS (1996-2001) 
International intervention in 1994 succeeded in reinstating Aristide’s government 
after three years of failed negotiations and the imposition of economic sanctions. One of 
Haiti’s first efforts to combat drug trafficking after the restoration of a democratic 
government in 1994 was to become a party to the 1961 UN Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs and its 1972 Protocol.  Additionally, Haiti became a party to the 1988 UN 
Convention in 1995.  Moreover, Haiti's main counternarcotics initiatives have focused on 
establishing the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) and Counternarcotic Unit, which is part of 
the HNP.  Moreover, President Rene Preval (who succeeded Aristide in 1996) appointed 
Rena Maglorie as Special Advisor for Judicial Reform in the Ministry of Justice to 
develop a national narcotic plan, draft narcotic laws and develop money- laundering 
legislation. 77  Given the pressing domestic law enforcement demands, the establishment 
of the CNU and HCG and their commitment to counternarcotics training has been 
impressive.  The lack of infrastructure, personnel and material resources will remain a 
limiting factor in Haiti’s ability to combat narcotics trafficking.  For example, the HCG is 
limited in its operations to the Gulf of Gonave, while most of the nation's narcotics 
problems occur in its unregulated regional ports.  
In 1996, Haiti continued the transition to a civilian police force by dissolving the 
Army (FADH) organizations, especially those involved in narcotics law enforcement.  
The Center for Coordination and Intelligence, a narcotic agency, was also disbanded in 
March 1996.  The Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) began training a Counternarcotics Unit 
(CNU) in August.  The former Minister of Justice, Rene Magloire, was appointed to 
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advance judicial reforms of the existing narcotics laws, develop a national narcotics plan 
and to implement money-laundering legislation.  
Haiti signed a letter of agreement in September 1996 with the U.S. to continue 
financial assistance to the Haitian Coast Guard and to assist in security-related measures 
affecting the Port-au-Prince airport and seaports.78  The Haitian Customs Service 
participated in two U.S. Customs training sessions for narcotics interdiction at airport 
facilities.  Narcotics control at the airport shifted to the airlines and their security staff, 
who turn suspects over to the HNP, which that is stationed at the airport.  In an effort to 
increase HNP’s effectiveness, seventy-five members of the counternarcotics unit were 
selected to receive partial training during the year.   
The HCG began operations in August 1996 and made two major cocaine seizures 
totaling 938 kgs in its first two months of operations.  President Preval began his own 
anticorruption campaign, which included drug corruption. On October 1, Preval had one 
judge arrested for releasing an alleged Dominican drug trafficker.  He dismissed another 
judge from judicial responsibilities because the judge was accused of improprieties in 
narcotic related cases.  In addition, two officers were removed in 1996 for drug related 
problems.  Haiti began discussing a bilateral maritime counternarcotics accord with the 
U.S., but no agreement was in place by the end of 1996.   
1. Impasse from 1997 
Unfortunately, much of the progress on drug control accomplished by the Aristide 
and Preval governments between 1994 and 1996 came to a halt, along with all other 
government activity, as the result of a political impasse, which began in 1997 and has 
persisted to this day.  The Lavalas coalition, which supported both Aristide and then 
Preval as President, united over important policies like privatization and the role of 
Aristide within the movement.  President Rene Preval’s mishandling of legislative 
elections in 1997 led to political strife and Preval’s dissolution of parliament in January 
1999.  This move seriously undermined his government’s legitimacy and deepened the 
economic crisis as offshore assembly factories closed and tourism collapsed.  It became 
impossible to pass new legislation, a situation, which undermined significant portions of 
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the government’s couunterdrug efforts.  For example, the Ministry of Justice’s Special 
Advisor on Narcotics Matters completed Haiti’s anti-drug policy initiatives in 1997 and 
drafted a National Narcotics Plan, but it has been unable to secure legislative approval of 
these initiatives because of the political impasse.  The initiatives consisted of 
comprehensive narcotics legislation updating Haiti’s existing laws, including Haiti’s first 
money-laundering legislation.   
Despite the challenges posed by the political deadlock, the government of Haiti 
continued in 1997 to implement the legal mechanisms and governmental policies that it 
could to counter organized trafficking elements.  For example, the Minister of Justice 
(MOJ) began to establish an inter-ministerial task force to unify the GOH's anti-narcotics 
program and initiatives.  The HNP and Haitian Customs leaders also developed policy 
guidelines to further the cooperation between the two offices.  The combined efforts of 
the HCG and United States Coast Guard (USCG) maritime efforts yielded over nine tons 
of marijuana and 2.1 metric tons of cocaine in 1997. On October 17, 1997, the 
government of Haiti and the United States signed a bilateral maritime counternarcotics 
agreement that allow U.S. law enforcement vessels and aircraft greater access to Haitian 
territory in the pursuit and interdiction of narcotics traffickers.  The Haitian government 
continued to give USG officials’ high- level assurances of its commitment to drug control, 
and those assurances were supported by their progress in establishing Haitian counter-
drug institutions.  
Many of the critical anti-drug policy initiatives begun in 1997 by Haiti remained 
on hold throughout 1998 because of the continuing political impasse.  The Ministry of 
Justice began to work on revising the National Master Plan drafted in May 1997.  Haiti's 
counternarcotics objectives for 1998 were to give Parliament the set of anti-drug 
trafficking laws including money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, which had been 
drafted in 1997, to implement the "National Master Plan for Combating Drugs in Haiti," 
and to target at least one major international narcotics organization for significant 
interdiction efforts.79  However, according to the constitution, no new legislation, 
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including the anti-drug laws and the "National Master Plan for Combating Drugs in 
Haiti" could be presented to the Parliament for enactment until the crisis was resolved.   
Despite this legislative impasse and lack of direction from the executive branch, 
Haiti’s counternarcotic units continued to cooperate with one another and with their 
regional and U.S. counterparts in drug-control efforts.  In March 1998, Haiti hosted a 
U.S.-funded Intelligence Sharing Conference in Port au Prince that was attended by key 
counternarcotics officials from Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.  Additionally, the 
HNP proposed a five-point strategic counternarcotics plan in which three points were 
related to Haiti's regional counternarcotics role in the Caribbean, the fourth called for 
joint Haiti-Dominican Republic efforts to secure their common border, and the fifth 
proposed an information exchange center within the HNP to handle internal narco-
corruption. 80   
The HNP leadership with the assistance of the DEA started an interagency joint 
counternarcotics task force consisting of the HNP and Customs which began operating at 
the Port-au-Prince International Airport.  In addition, a task force comprised of the HNP 
and National Port Authority officers begin operating at the main Port au Prince seaport.  
Haiti signed a Letter of Agreement with the UN International Drugs Control Program 
regarding the writing of a National Drug Strategy and the development of a seven-part 
National Drug Council for coordination among Haitian services working on 
counternarcotics effort.  Haiti also signed a Joint Intelligence Coordination Center 
agreement with the U.S.  The Haitian Coast Guard fully cooperated with the USCG "ship 
rider" program and demonstrated some independent initiative at sea.  In addition, the 
HNP counternarcotics unit increased the quantity of drugs seized without direct U.S. 
assistance.  Haiti initiated the first joint Haitian-Dominican drug monitoring effort at the 
Malpasse-Jimani border crossing.  In December of 1998, the Special Advisor to the 
Ministry of Justice indicated his intention to begin working with relevant Haiti authorities 
to revise the National Master Plan.  
During 1999, some counterdrug operations were undertaken, however, the critical 
anti-drug legislative initiatives continued to be on hold throughout the year.  The Prime 
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Minister ordered a special judicial review committee to have a new legislation ready for 
presentation to the new parliament once it was seated in the summer of 2000.  In 1999, 
the government of Haiti and the U.S. targeted the principal Colombian drug trafficking 
organization (the Coneo family) operating in Haiti and two of its key members were 
arrested.  The proposed Haiti and the U.S. Maritime Counternarcotics Interdiction 
Agreement was implemented, which included an agreement to expel non-Haitian 
fugitives wanted by the U.S. Justice Department.  Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
cooperated in a Haitian border-control unit and police-exchange program.  Prime 
Minister Alexis approved the concept of the 1997 draft Counternarcotics master plan, 
which created the National Drug Council and formed a special anti-corruption 
commission.  A special judiciary team updated the counternarcotics draft legislation for 
parliament's earliest approval.   
The HNP leadership has repeatedly exhibited cooperation with U.S. authorities in 
counternarcotics efforts.  In addition to working with the DEA to disrupt the Coneo 
organization's trafficking operation in Haiti, the HNP collaborated with U.S. authorities 
in two operations that combined assets from the USCG, the DEA, U.S. Customs and the 
Haiti.  Haiti also collaborated with the U.S. in the federal prosecution of a U.S. airline 
flight attendant accused of transporting 10 kilos of cocaine from Port au Prince to Miami.  
The Haiti law enforcement officials supported U.S. efforts to establish a Joint 
Information Coordination Center (JICC) in the Port au Prince International Airport. The 
HNP provided three well-trained intelligence analysts to the JICC staff in October.  They 
approved a bi-weekly coordination meeting of the Haitian Coast Guard and the new 
counternarcotics unit with their U.S. Embassy counterparts to combat airdrops and 
maritime smuggling.  
During 2000, a trailer was refitted as an office and located at the Port-au-Prince 
seaport for use by the interagency maritime interdiction task force.  This location now 
serves as a coordination center for maritime interdiction activities off Haiti’s coasts and 
in port. With the DEA’s guidance, the task force conducted port surveys throughout Haiti 
to develop sources of information and contacts with port authorities and other law 
enforcement entities.  The Haitian airport and maritime drug units are evolving into 
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disciplined professional units, according to the DEA, that are increasingly willing to work 
with U.S. counterparts. The fledgling organizations show a willingness to work and to 
improve their professional capabilities.  
In March, the Haiti participated in Operation Conquistador that resulted in an 
increased level of vehicle and vessel searches, airline passenger and baggage inspection, 
and search warrants in areas of high drug trafficking activity. 81 However, no large 
seizures were reported.  The government of Haiti cooperated in maritime interdiction 
operations with the U.S. Coast Guard and multilateral interdiction operations, but 
attempts to curb corruption in 2000 were minimal. 
In spite of some progress, the Haiti law enforcements continue to suffer from 
inexperience, an outdated legal system, and a lack of interagency coordination.  The 
Prime Minister ordered the heads of HNP, Customs, Immigration, and the Foreign 
Ministry to discuss increased cooperation among Haiti law enforcement agencies in the 
airport and other interagency endeavors throughout Haiti, but no concrete results have 
ensued. Thus, Haitian authorities continued to be deprived of needed criminal laws and 
law enforcement tools and continue to suffer from inexperience, lack of resources, a 
crumbling infrastructure, and an antiquated legal system.82  In sum, political impasses, 
economic instability and lack of political will undermine Haiti’s counternarcotics 
initiatives for much of the 1990s. 
2. Aristide and Tactical Cooperation 
With President Aristide’s inauguration in 2001, the prospects for increased drug 
control efforts seemed hopeful.  The election of a new legislature put an end to the long 
political impasse, which had blocked counterdrug legislation and the new president 
seemed committed to drug control.  As a candidate for democracy and for a better life for 
Haitian people, former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had pledged to "enhance 
substantially cooperation to combat drug trafficking" in a December 27 letter to President 
Clinton.  Aristide tends to make sweeping promises and then fails to keep them.  To 
illustrate, Aristide declared that he was in favor of election for a regulatory parliament, 
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but he has not officially addressed the matter in Haiti.  Secretary of State Colin Powel 
called Aristide’s stated willingness to cooperate with the United States an appropriate 
way to proceed.83   
After Aristide assumed power in 2001, an anti-money laundering law and a 
national drug-control strategy law was approved by Parliament and signed by President 
Aristide.  However, Aristide did not sign the bilateral maritime law enforcement 
agreement or the letter of agreement proposed by the United States. Haiti cooperated on a 
limited, tactical level with the United States on drug control in 2001.  Haiti coordinated 
with the U.S. in terms of expulsion of third-country nationals in the United States and 
Dominican Republic.84  Haiti’s Justice Minister Lissade acted quickly to extradite non-
Haitian traffickers when requested and established a Financial Investigations Unit to 
combat money laundering.  Even though Haiti did not put the pending bilateral maritime 
counternarcotics agreement into force, the government permitted the U.S. Coast Guard to 
operate against traffickers in Haitian waters. 
In August Haiti’s central bank published a circular directing commercial banks, 
savings banks, foreign exchange brokers and transfer agencies to report to Haiti 
individual monetary transactions valued at or above the Haitian gourde equivalent of 
$10,000 U.S. dollars. This is Haiti’s first known attempt to address money laundering 
through Haitian banking institutions.  The United Nations Drug Control Program 
(UNDCP) has provided a money- laundering expert to work with the Haiti on 
implementing the new legislation.  Haiti adopted and published a money laundering law 
and the Law for the Control and Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking in 2001, but trials 
and convictions were rare.   
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During a September regional counternarcotics operation, "Operation Hurricane," 
the Haitian National Police (HNP) worked closely with the DEA and Dominican 
Republic counternarcotics force.  The HNP coordinated with the DEA and other 
countries in the Caribbean on multi-related operations.85  Haiti joined the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) in October 2001.   
Following the 2001 inauguration of President Aristide, changes in the HNP 
leadership were made including the removal of Mario Andersol, the Chief of the Judicial 
Police whose replacement had still not been appointed by the end of 2001.  These 
changes led to more changes at lower levels, which affected the HNP’s ability to deal 
with the drug problem.  The HNP suffered problems, yet they managed to seize 446 
kilograms of cocaine during 2001, and they eradicated marijuana fields in Gonaives, Pont 
Sonde, and Belle Anse.   
Haiti lacks the capability to stem the illegal flow of drugs transiting the country 
and the law enforcement and judicial institution to address illegal drugs and pursue drug 
traffickers operating in Haiti.  Haiti must develop an effective drug interdiction capability 
and improve the skills of prosecutors and judges and their entire legal system.   
B. U.S. ACTIONS TO ASSIST HAITI (1996-2001) 
The U.S. strategy for combating illegal drugs in Haiti is to reduce the amount of 
narcotics transiting Haiti and strengthen the capacity and operational effectiveness of the 
Haiti institutions that oppose narcotics trafficking.  To achieve these goals the U.S. must 
provide the law enforcement entities and the justice sector with training, equipment, 
infrastructure, and operational support and mentoring.  The strategy also calls for the U.S. 
to foster interagency and international cooperation among Haitian officials and fight 
corruption wherever possible. 
1. Focus on the Coast Guard 
The Haitian Coast Guard program was funded primarily by U.S. security 
assistance and has been very successful.  The U.S. is financing CNU equipment and 
training.   




The U.S. Coast Guard, a significant player in counter-drug efforts, is responsible 
for curbing the non-commercial maritime flow of cocaine to the United States.86 U.S. 
bilateral cooperation consists of limited information sharing with the HNP and assistance 
with combined U.S. Coast Guard/HCG operations. U.S. law enforcement agencies have 
received Haiti’s approval and assistance in maritime boarding cases.  The USG has also 
received assistance on narcotics cases with airport officials and the Seaport Authority.  
In 1997, the U.S. and Haiti elevated most of the ad hoc cooperation on maritime 
operations. The U.S. and Haiti signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA) in support of 
counternarcotics activities focused on the continued development of the HCG and the 
CNU.  The U.S. Coast Guard has cooperated in four separate maritime interdictions with 
the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) that intercepted over two metric tons of cocaine during 
1997.  In 1998 the U.S. Southern Command reserved $350,000 for HCG infrastructure 
development along with an additional $300,000 to support HCG training.  In 1999 the 
U.S. Southern Command earmarked approximately USD $300,000 for infrastructure and 
training support to the HCG to execute Operations Frontier Lance II and Columbus. 
2. DEA Coordination 
The DEA maintains an office with two agents in Haiti that works closely with the 
HNP and other Haiti officials on narcotics matters. The DEA office worked with the 
HNP, U.S. air carrier security personnel and the Haiti airport security official in seizing 
narcotics.   
The DEA increased its staffing in Haiti from two to seven at the end of 1998.  The 
DEA also established the multi-agency counternarcotics task forces, the CNU “street” 
investigation unit, installed of the Unified Caribbean On-Line Regional Network 
(UNICORN) at HNP and CNU headquarters, held the Chemical Identification Seminar 
for a multi-agency class, and set up a border patrol unit at Malpasse.  In 1999 the staff of 
the DEA's Port Au Prince Country Office established eight permanent members.  The 
DEA also divided the HNP's team into three distinct groups to address street, maritime, 
and airport security and took leadership roles in Operations Frontier Lance II and 
Columbus.  
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At the present time, the DEA coordinates many investigations and initiatives with 
the HNP.87  With a crew of eight special agents and an office assistant, the DEA’s efforts 
have proven to be successful.  The DEA initiated a series of multinational regional 
operations to create an integrated regional response to drug trafficking activities and to 
maximize scarce resources.  The multi-national regional initiatives have had a positive 
effect of dis rupting the flow of drugs through the Caribbean for several reasons:    
 First, from an operational perspective, the use of the UNICORN system 
by law enforcement organizations from different countries establishes a 
viable intelligence sharing network and the necessary communication 
structure needed to coordinate long-term operations. Secondly, the 
extensive political support for counter-drug efforts that continues to be 
generated by these types of initiatives facilitates the integration of anti-
narcotics efforts. Thirdly, many participating countries strengthen their 
bilateral and multilateral relationships during operational phases.  
Increased coordination, experience, and sophisticated investigative 
techniques will facilitate the region’s capability to conduct complex 
investigations targeting the leadership of significant drug trafficking 
organizations.88 
3. Customs and Justice Institutions  
U.S. Customs is currently involved in an ongoing U.S.AID-funded assistance 
project so that the Haiti Customs Department can effectively control the borders and the 
flow of illicit contraband.  This project provides several narcotics interdiction courses, 
on-site U.S. Customs technical advisors, short-term legal advisories, executive 
observation trips to the U.S., and basic inspection equipment.   
In September of 1999, the United States and Haiti signed a letter of agreement 
under which the U.S. provided the United State Department of Defense $620,000 in 
counternarcotics assistance funds. The agreement covers law enforcement training, a 
Haitian-Dominican border counternarcotics initiative, the formation of a special 
investigative team to combat major international traffickers, and money- laundering 
efforts.  
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Virgil, April 12, 2000. 
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A U.S. Customs training and assistance team conducted five training missions for Haitian 
Customs and the HNP during 1999, focusing on search procedures for seagoing vessels 
and aircraft. They also provided inspection and training equipment to Haitian Customs 
agents.  Moreover, they adamantly pressed for the extradition or expulsion of traffickers 
under indictment in the United States who were detained in Haiti.  In August 1998, the 
U.S. and Haiti signed an amendment to their counternarcotics Letter of Agreement, 
which provided an increase in assistance funds and placed more emphasis on 
strengthening the failing judicial sector regarding drug cases. This agreement focused on 
the continued development of the HCG and CNU and also established of a viable border 
patrol unit and installed of the JICC. 
4. Stalling in FY-2000 
Some bilateral programs showed potential; however, Haiti did not sign a letter of 
agreement for FY-2000 counternarcotics assistance funds.  Assistance has been 
suspended until the new Bush administration’s intentions on counternarcotics cooperation 
are clarified.  The United States assisted a mobile training team of four members in Haiti 
working daily with the HCG. 89  The Bilateral Coast Guard Program showed measurable 
progress during 2000, but was suspended owing to restrictions in the FY-2001 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act. 
The United States had no bilateral counternarcotics program with Haiti in 2001. 
The United States offered to sign a letter of agreement with Haiti, but the 2001 offer was 
not accepted.  Despite the lack of a formal counternarcotics agreement between the U.S. 
and Haiti, the DEA maintained a permanent staff of eight agents in Port-au-Prince. 
The United States is exploring ways to reduce illegal drug trafficking in the transit 
zone between the source countries and the United States.  Haiti lacks the necessary 
resources to counter this threat within the Transit Zone effectively.  The “United States’ 
strategy efforts were to foster Haitian interagency cooperation, Haitian cooperation with 
other countries, and the willingness and ability for Haiti to fight corruption in their 
government.”90   
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 International Narcotic Control Strategy Report, 2001. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Drug control efforts have been frustrated due to the lack of a bilateral maritime 
counternarcotics agreement between the U.S. and Haiti.  The key objectives to combating 
the illegal flow of drugs include improving the effectiveness of the Haiti’s law 
enforcement and judicial institutions and pursuing drug traffickers in Haiti.  To 
accomplish these objectives, the HNP must be trained and equipped to develop an 
effective drug interdiction.  Haiti also must be trained and equipped to conduct 
counternarcotics investigations.  The United States urges interagency cooperation among 
Haitian Customs, Immigration, and Judiciary, but emphasis instead ought to be placed on 
achieving a bilateral agreement so that necessary assistance and training will be available.    
The State Department has viewed Haiti as failing to collaborate with the U.S. to 
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. 91  Haiti claimed the reason was, in part, 
insufficient resources.  However, to Haiti counternarcotics matters are lower in priority 
than social order and public safety concerns. Consequently, most counternarcotics law 
enforcement accomplishments are the United States’ programs that have provided 


















                                                 

























Traditionally, Haiti has been a haven for illicit enterprise.  Haiti emerged as a 
cocaine transshipment point between Colombia and the United States in the 1980s.  Its 
strategic geographic location and political culture make the country an ideal place from 
which to run drug trafficking.  Drug traffickers continue to use Haitian waters and 
airspace with little resistance due to a fledgling political base, uncontrolled borders, and 
inadequate law enforcement resources.  According to George A. Fauriol, “A wide path of 
drug trafficking is enveloping the entire Caribbean and turning receptive nations, like 
Haiti, into secure drug havens or, more accurately, narco-states.”92  Consequently today, 
the government of Haiti must confront extensive corruption, weak institutions and scarce 
resources. 
Despite the U.S. intervention in 1994 and the establishment of a civilian 
democratic government, Haiti continues to be a haven for drug trafficking and money 
laundering.  Evidence of these activities has increased since the intervention and because 
of Haiti’s ingrained political culture and socioeconomic structures, these illicit activities 
are exceedingly difficult to eliminate.  The U.S. short-term military occupations cannot 
possibly end Haiti’s long-standing political and economic practices.  Political, economic 
and judicial reform will be needed over a long period of time to reverse 200 years of 
mismanagement by previously repressive dictatorships.   
Haiti is slowly becoming an increasingly confident civil society, with a free and 
active press, improved respect for human rights, vocal political opposition, decreased 
population growth, and increased literacy and access to basic health and population 
programs. Building on these accomplishments, Haitians can move their country toward a 
more responsive and democratic governance and away from a long history of oppression 
and severe underdevelopment. 
As a representative of the impoverished populace, current President Aristide 
believes the government should take actions toward relieving the suffering of the poorest 
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members of society.  Economic restructuring and privatization reforms are unattractive to 
political leaders because they create higher levels of unemployment and increased 
poverty levels in the short term.  The officials need to understand that the entire society, 
especially the wretchedly poor will be affected, but selecting when and which economic 
policies are applied can ease the severity of the effects. 
Haiti unquestioningly has made significant strides in establishing democratic 
governance, yet if Haitians are to be weaned from illicit activities, they must be 
encouraged to diversify their economies and construct the necessary infrastructure that 
will provide adequate employment for the poor and the necessary business atmosphere 
for legitimate entrepreneurs.   
To uphold the rule of law, the Haitian judicial system must be reformed and 
modernized.  Their law enforcement requires extensive training and resources.  
Especially on the south coast, the Haitian Coast Guard requires more bases and their 
airport and port security should be strengthened.  If these reforms are not undertaken, 
Haiti will continue to be used as a significant transshipment point for drug trafficking. 
Haiti over time can effectively dismantle drug trafficking organizations that rise 
to provide that the HNP continues to progress and enhance their law enforcement and 
judicial capabilities.  Today, the DEA has an effective working relationship with some 
key officials in Haiti.  The DEA will continue to address the drug trafficking threat in 
Haiti and will continue to plan law enforcement operations in conjunction with the 
Haitian National Police.  Moreover the U.S. and international community must remain 
engaged.  
U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere recognizes that its support for social and 
economic development in this region cannot succeed if the hemisphere's democracies are 
weak. U.S. democracy programs can guarantee that governments like Haiti have the 
knowledge and the commitment to protect the rights of their citizens and deliver the 
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